A game in extensive form specifies when each player in the game is to move, what his information is about the sequence of previous moves, which chance. Aug 1, 2018 - PDF| Game Theory is a powerful tool for Decision Making. 1st, Chapter: Strategic Behoviour and Game Theory, Publisher: Flat. Grudger (Co-operate, but only be a sucker once) - Co-operate until the opponent.
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Solution Concepts for Static Games Complete information: Rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, epistemic foundations Game Theory Chapters 1 and 2. Econometrica 52, no.
4 (1984): 1007–28. Pearce, David G. Econometrica 52, no. 4 (1984): 1029–50.
Aumann, Robert, and Adam Brandenburger. Econometrica 63, no. 5 (1995): 1161–80. Incomplete information: Bayesian Nash equilibrium, interim correlated rationalizability Brandenburger, Adam, and Eddie Dekel. Journal of Economic Theory 59, no. 1 (1993): 189–98.
Dekel, Eddie, Drew Fudenberg, and Stephen Morris. Theoretical Economics, no. 2 (2007): 15–40. Theoretical Economics, no. 1 (2006): 275–309.
Solution Concepts for Extensive-Form Games Backwards induction, subgame perfection, iterated conditional dominance Game Theory Chapter 3. Bargaining with complete information Rubinstein, Ariel.
Econometrica 50, no. 1 (1982): 97–109. Manea, Mihai. Equilibrium Concepts for Games with Imperfect Information Sequential, perfect, and proper equilibria Game Theory Chapter 8. Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson.
Econometrica 50, no. 4 (1982): 863–94. Signaling and Forward Induction Stable equilibrium, the intuitive criterion, iterated weak dominance, epistemic foundations Game Theory Chapters 8 and 11.
Kohlberg, Elon, and Jean-Francois Mertens. Econometrica 54, no. 5 (1986): 1003–37. Cho, In-Koo, and David M. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, no. 2 (1987): 179–221. Battigalli, Pierpaola, and Marciano Siniscalchi.
Journal of Economic Theory 106, no. 2 (2002): 356–91. Govindan, Srihari, and Robert Wilson '.' Econometrica 77, no.
1 (2008): 1–28. Repeated Games Game Theory Chapter 5. Fudenberg, Drew, and Eric Maskin. Econometrica 54, no. 3 (1986): 533–54.
Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti. Econometrica 58, no. 5 (1990): 1041–63. Abreu, Dilip, Paul Milgrom, and David Pearce. Econometrica 59, no. 6 (1991): 1713–33.
Fudenberg, Drew, David Levine, and Eric Maskin. Econometrica 62, no. 5 (1994): 997–1039. Reputation Formation Reputation with short-lived opponents Game Theory Chapter 9.
Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. Journal of Economic Theory 27, no. 2 (1982): 253–79. Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. Journal of Economic Theory 27, no. 2 (1982): 280–312.
Kreps, David M., Paul Milgrom, et al. Journal of Economic Theory 27, no. 2 (1982): 245–52. Levine, David K., and Drew Fudenberg. Econometrica 57, no.
4 (1989): 759–78. Screening and reputation in bargaining Game Theory Chapter 10. Gul, Faruk, Hugo Sonnenschein, and Robert Wilson. Journal of Economic Theory 39, no. 1 (1986): 155–90. Abreu, Dilip, and Faruk Gul. Econometrica 68, no.
1 (2000): 85–117. Supermodular Games Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. Econometrica 58, no.
6 (1990): 1255–77. Vives, Xavier. Journal of Economic Literature 43, no. 2 (2005): 437–79.
Topkis, Donald M. Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton University Press, 1998. Van Zandt, Timothy, and Xavier Vives. Journal of Economic Theory 134, no. 1 (2007): 339–60. Immorlica, Nicole, Rachel Kranton, et al.
Global Games Carlsson, Hans, and Eric van Damme. “.” Econometrica 61, no. 5 (1993): 989–1018.
Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Song Shin. “.” American Economic Review 88, no.
3 (1998): 587-597. Cooperative Games Nash bargaining solution, core, Shapley value Nash, John F. “.” Econometrica 18, no. 2 (1950): 155–162. Shapley, Lloyd S. “A Value for n‐Person Games.” In Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol.
Princeton University Press, 1956. Manea, Mihai. “.” Journal of Economic Theory 133, no. 1 (2007): 331–349. Non-cooperative implementations Binmore, Ken, Ariel Rubinstein, and Asher Wolinsky. “.” RAND Journal of Economics 17, no.
Perry, Motty, and Philip J Reny. “.” Econometrica 62, no. 4 (1994) 795–817. This is one of over 2,200 courses on OCW.
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